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Abstract: Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation and processing of moral judgments 
by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical signifi cance, and brain 
imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical fi ndings of the ways we make 
moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. 
The aim of this special issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw 
any normative conclusions by discovering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments. 
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In this special issue, we have brought together six theoretical papers that discuss whether 
it is possible to draw any normative conclusions from experimental research in moral 
psychology. Two of the papers critically discuss some recent empirical research on me-
taethics and normative ethics: Lance S. Bush and David Moss highlight serious problems 
with measuring folk metaethical views on objectivism and relativism, Steven McFarlane 
and Heather Cipolletti Perez criticize the well-known view that using one’s non-native 
language reduces emotional arousal and increases the utilitarian response tendency in 
moral dilemmas. Two papers concern bioethics: Heidi Giebel argues that attributing 
increased moral status to fetal humans after seeing fetal ultrasound images may be 
rationally justifi ed, and Michael Klenk proposes four ways in which moral psychology 
can play a signifi cant role in bioethics, understood as a practically committed discipline. 
Finally, Norbert Paulo and Thomas Pölzler propose some new empirical research on 
impartiality thought experiments, and Wim De Neys, in his discussion note, discusses 
research that undermines any normative signifi cance of dual-process theory. 
The main motivation behind organizing this issue stems from recent work at the 
intersection of moral psychology and normative ethics that has tried to reveal the forma-
tion and processing of moral judgments, as well as identifying the emotional and cog-
nitive barriers that distort normative judgments. Moreover, it has been argued in recent 
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years that some cognitive biases and heuristics, or other psychological effects, infl uence 
the content of normative moral judgments. For example, some authors have argued 
that the status quo bias may strengthen hesitance about human enhancement (Bostrom 
& Ord 2006; Hofmann 2020), that the similarity heuristic may distort some distributive 
trade-offs in healthcare (Voorhoeve, Stefánsson, Wallace 2019), and that the identifi ability 
effect may lead to the ineffi cient use of scarce resources in healthcare (Żuradzki, 2019). 
These practical cases mirror more abstract discussions of whether new empirical fi ndings 
undermine the reliability of some intuitive ethical responses or some traditional norma-
tive views (e.g., alleged experimental evidence against deontology, see: Greene 2014; 
cf. Heinzelmann 2018). Even more broadly, some have argued that new discoveries in 
experimental psychology cast new light on traditional metaethical questions, e.g., whether 
moral judgments are based on reason or on emotion, with some authors have argued that 
experimental moral psychology challenges traditional moral rationalism or moral realism 
(Nichols 2004; cf. May 2018). This new wave of empirical research on ethical issues has 
also revived discussions on debunking arguments in ethics (Sauer 2018).
Another important inspiration for this issue comes from behavioral research 
on risk perception, risk attitudes, ambiguity aversion, and decision making under risk 
or uncertainty in general. A good example is a recent discussion on the possible use of 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman 2011) in ethics: some scholars have argued that Prospect 
Theory is a better explanation of our intuitive responses to some moral dilemma than 
traditional ethical principles, like a distinction between doing and allowing (Horowitz 
1998); others have reversed this order of explanation assuming that a distinction between 
doing and allowing is a genuine phenomenon that could explain some framing effects, 
e.g. the pattern of choices in the Asian Disease Problem (Dreisbach, Guevara 2017). Re-
cently, it has also been speculated that some decision-makers (e.g., members of ethics 
committees) are prone to ambiguity aversion that affect the way they evaluate known 
uncertainties or risks (e.g., related to standard medical procedures), with the comparison 
of deep uncertainties (e.g., related to new advances in biomedicine) (Kimmelman 2012). 
Finally, we encouraged submissions on the signifi cance of empirical moral psy-
chology for bioethics as it has been argued that the psychological effects documented 
by behavioral scientists infl uence the formation of normative judgments in bioethical 
contexts, e.g., the psychological underpinnings of the disagreement about the moral 
status of the human embryo. The biases and heuristics research program also has an 
impact on some of the main bioethical concepts, e.g., in the case of autonomy, it is de-
bated how biases and heuristics research may change the understanding of this concept 
(Blumenthal-Barby 2016).
Selecting the papers for publication and the winners of the international essay 
prize competition was extremely diffi cult. The editors of Diametros ultimately decided to 
award three fi rst prizes (6,000 PLN each) to Lance S. Bush and David Moss for the paper 
“Misunderstanding Metaethics: Diffi culties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism,” 
to Steven McFarlane and Heather Cipolletti Perez for the paper “Some Challenges for 
Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case 
Study,” and to Norbert Paulo and Thomas Pölzler for the paper “X-Phi and Impartiality 
Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance.”
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In the fi rst paper of this special issue of Diametros, Lance S. Bush and David Moss 
analyze recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people (Bush, Moss 2020). 
Although there is a considerable body of research suggesting that ordinary people are 
metaethical pluralists, the Authors argue that there are compelling reasons to believe 
that participants do not interpret questions as intended by researchers because they lack 
familiarity with the views they are being asked about due to their complex and diffi cult 
to grasp nature. They notice that some research about objectivism and relativism defi ne 
these terms differently – either in terms of mind-independence or in terms of the scope 
of moral judgments. The paper also discusses (and describes an online experiment 
conducted on this issue) a paradigm used to evaluate folk metaethical beliefs, i.e., the 
disagreement paradigm that assumes that a judgment that it is possible for different 
people to be correct about two contradictory moral statements is interpreted as evidence 
of relativism. 
Heidi Giebel evaluates the changes in moral judgment that sometimes take place 
when viewers of ultrasounds abandon the belief that fetal humans are due minimal 
moral consideration and instead adopt the judgment that fetal humans are morally 
comparable to fully developed humans. The problem is both theoretically interesting (on 
the epistemic role of photographic images as visual information see: Favaretto, Vears, 
Borry 2020) and practically relevant because many people argue that using ultrasound 
images may be used to manipulate women in an attempt to persuade them to continue 
with their pregnancies. Giebel analyzes three types of psychological explanation for the 
effect of ultrasound images of fetal humans on some viewers’ judgments, arguing that 
the viewer’s shift in beliefs is presumptively rational in each case.
Michael Klenk’s paper discusses the “clouded relations” between bioethics and 
empirical moral psychology. The Author assumes that bioethics is not only practically 
oriented (as is the case with other parts of practical ethics) but also practically committed, 
that is, bioethicists aim to effect decisions in practice and devote signifi cant efforts to 
making that happen. This “activist” aspect of bioethics makes moral psychology norma-
tively signifi cant for this discipline, even though it may be insignifi cant for normative 
ethics. Klenk argues that empirical moral psychology may help bioethicists to understand 
the actual or current state of a decision situation; the genealogy of our moral judgments; 
the effectiveness and realisability of bioethical decisions; and, last but not least, to revise 
at least some of our moral principles or decision guidelines. 
In the next paper Steven McFarlane and Heather Cipolletti Perez analyze em-
pirical research on the relation between using native language and being emotional 
on the example of the so-called moral foreign-language effect (MFLE). It assumes that 
individuals reasoning in a foreign language more often prefer a utilitarian option over 
a deontological one (McFarlane, Perez 2020). The Authors notice important methodo-
logical problems with measuring emotions, since experiments obviously do not test for 
“emotions” directly, but use different proxies and different methods (changes in skin 
conductance, neuroscientifi c evidence, behavioral response patterns, patterns in judg-
ment responses, qualitative reports of the felt emotion, etc.). They conclude that using 
emotion as a proxy for deontological responses, and utilitarian responses as a proxy for 
reduced emotionality, is at least dubious, if not unjustifi ed. 
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Norbert Paulo and Thomas Pölzler notice an important gap in empirically-in-
formed research on impartiality thought experiments, namely attempts to elicit intuitions 
that are unaffected by personal characteristics, e.g., age, gender, or race (Paulo, Pölzler 
2020). They focus on a particularly infl uential example, the veil of ignorance, both in its 
original Rawlsian version (rVOI) and in a more generic form (iVOI), that is sometimes 
used in practical context (e.g., to defend quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as a right 
method of measuring health). The Authors discuss possible experiments on the effective-
ness of VOI, or the extent to which impartiality thought experiments fulfi ll the function 
for which they were created; and its robustness, that is, its (in)sensitivity to irrelevant 
factors. The paper concludes that this type of research – if conducted – could have at 
least one important implication: favoring a certain normative judgment behind the VOI 
(in comparison to the standard choice situation) provides stronger pro tanto evidence 
for accepting this judgment.
Finally, in a discussion note, Wim De Neys answers the main question of this 
issue in the negative, arguing that we cannot draw any normative conclusions by dis-
covering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments (De Neys, 2020). He 
criticizes the part of the literature that associates biases with the operation of intuitive 
System 1, and that connects unbiased responses with the successful engagement of the 
deliberate System 2 (Greene 2013), noticing that the early dual-process theorists argued 
against this simplifi cation, sometimes called a “normative fallacy” (Evans 2011). The 
Author observes that knowledge about the way (intuition vs. deliberation) people have 
arrived at a decision does not allow us to draw any conclusions about its normative 
correctness. Finally, the paper briefl y reviews the recent literature in psychology that 
shows that utilitarian responses, contrary to what is very often assumed, do not typically 
result from System 2 processing (Baron, Gürçay 2017). 
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